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MUST THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE HAVE A 
PERSONAL CAUSE?: A REJOINDER 
William Craig 
Wes Morriston maintains that a negative answer to the question, "Did the 
First Cause exist in time prior to creation?" forces the defender of the kalam 
cosmological argument to analyze the concept of 'begirming to exist' in a way 
that raises serious doubts about the argument's main causal principle and that 
it also undercuts the main argument for saying that the cause of the universe 
must be a person. 
Morriston in the first part of his critique tries to show that premiss 
(l)Wlzatever begins to exist has a cause loses much of its plausibility when it is 
applied to the beginning of time itself. At the heart of Morriston's denial that 
we have a metaphysical intuition of the principle's truth Jies a dubious distinc-
tion between intra- and extratemporal beginnings. Apart from that same dis-
tinction Morriston provides no good reason to doubt the plausibility of the 
causal principle as an empirical generalization. His claim that the absence of a 
material cause of the universe is as troubling as the absence of an efficient 
cause backfires because in an uncaused origination of the universe we lack 
both. Finally, Morriston errs in thinking that a reductive analysis, if adequate, 
should preserve the same epistemic obviousness involved in the analysandllm 
and in thinking that all intuitively grasped, metaphysically necessary, synthet-
ic truths should exhibit the same self-evidence and perspicuity. 
In the second part of his article Morriston, still assuming that God exists 
atemporally sans the universe, criticizes an argument for the personhood of 
the First Cause inspired by the Islamic Principle of Determination. Morriston 
objects that appeal to agent causation is nugatory because God's changeless 
state of willing the w1iverse is sufficient for the existence of the universe and is 
an instance of state-state causation. The failing of Morriston's objection is that 
in speaking of God's willing that the universe exist, he does not differentiate 
between God's timeless intention to create a temporal world and God's under-
taking to create a temporal world. Once we make the distinction, we see that 
creation ex nihilo is not (given a tensed theory of time) an instance of state-state 
causation and is therefore not susceptible to Morriston's objection. 
In his interesting article "Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a 
Personal Cause?" Wes Morriston explores several "little discussed aspects" 
of the ancient kalam cosmological argument.1 The argument may be simply 
formulated: 
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. 
2. The universe began to exist. 
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3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence. 
Morriston grants that the philosophical arguments for premiss (2) are sound 
in order to focus our attention on the problems that arise when we ask, 
"Did the First Cause exist in time prior to creation?"2 Since that question 
must concern anyone who holds to the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of crcatio 
ex nihilo, Morriston's critique will be of interest not only to the proponent of 
the kalam cosmological argument but to any orthodox theologian. 
I have argued that it is a matter of indifference so far as the argument's 
cogency is concerned whether the First Cause of the universe is conceived 
to be temporal or atemporal sans creation. But Morriston claims that such a 
contention is mistaken. He maintains that a negative answer to the question 
"Did the First Cause exist in time prior to creation?"-that is to say, to 
maintain that God exists atemporally sans the w1iverse-is not compatible 
with all the requirements of the kalam cosmological argument; specifically, a 
negative answer "forces the defender of the kalam argument to analyze the 
concept of 'beginning to exist' in a way that raises serious doubts about its 
main causal principle, and. .. it also undercuts the main argument for say-
ing that the cause of the universe must be a person."3 The problem espied 
by Morriston, then, is not that a negative answer to his question is logically 
incompatible with the argument's premisses or entailments but that such an 
answer tends to undercut the warrant for accepting those premisses; in 
short, the argument becomes in a sense self-defeating (even if sound). 
Must the Universe Have a Cause? 
Assuming, then, that the First Cause did not exist temporally prior to 
the beginning of the universe and that, accordingly, time itself was created 
along with the universe, Morriston in the first part of his critique will "try 
to show that premiss (1) loses much of its plausibility when it is applied to 
the beginning of time itself."4 Now it needs to be said that, pace Morriston, 
this is not a conclusion which automatically spells defeat for the kalam cos-
mological argument. For in order to qualify as a successful piece of natural 
theology an argument need not consist of premisses which are undeniably 
true, or clearly true, or even plausibly true, but of premisses which are 
merely more plausibly true than their contradictories. If, as I believe, the 
premiss Everytlzing that begins to exist has a cause is plausible in excels is for 
temporally embedded things, then even if Morriston is right that its plausi-
bility is significantly diminished when it comes to time itself, that does not 
in any way show that premiss (1) is implausible, much less no more plausi-
ble than its contradictory. Thus, the argument is not even ostensibly 
defeated by Morriston's conclusion. 
But however that may be, we shall, of course, also want to ask whether 
Morriston is successful in establishing his conclusion. Why think that pre-
miss (1) loses much of its plausibility when applied to the beginning of 
time? Morriston acknowledges that "it does seem pretty absurd" to imag-
ine something's popping into existence without a cause: "It may not be logi-
cally impossible, but it is inconsistent with everything I know of the world 
in which I live!'" So why deny this intuition when it comes to the origin of 
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time and the universe? Morriston's basic answer is that even if we have 
such an intuition with respect to temporally embedded entities, we do not 
have a similar intuition with regard to the beginning of time itself. 
Now as a simple sociological claim, Morriston's assertion is demonstra-
bly false. For the absolute beginning of time predicted by the Standard 
Friedman-Lemaitre Big Bang model was the crucial factor in provoking not 
only the formulation of the Steady State model of continuous creation, but 
a whole series of subsequent models all aimed at avoiding the origin ex 
nihilo of our universe. Misner, Thome, and Wheeler declare that "No prob-
lem of cosmology digs more deeply into the foundations of physics than 
the question of what 'preceded' the 'initial state' of infinite (or near infinite) 
density, pressure, and temperature."" For example, inflationary theorist 
Andrei Linde finds motivation for his past-eternal Chaotic Inflationary 
Model precisely in this feature of the Standard Model: liThe most difficult 
aspect of this problem is not the existence of the singularity itself, but the 
question of what was before the singularity .... This problem lies some-
where at the boundary between physics and metaphysics."? Linde's 
extrapolation of his model to the infinite past was rooted, not in any empir-
ical inadequacy of the Standard Model, but in the conviction that the 
absolute beginning predicted by that model was not acceptable as an 
explanatory stopping point. Although Borde and Vilenkin demonstrated 
that Linde's inflationary model was geodesically incomplete in the past 
and therefore itself involved an initial cosmological singularity, they did 
not conclude that the question of the origin of the universe was therefore a 
pseudo-problem; rather they wrote, liThe fact that inflationary spacetimes 
are past incomplete forces one to address the question of what, if anything, 
came before. liS The fact is that a whole series of cosmological models have 
been proposed over the last half-century specifically to avoid the absolute 
beginning predicted by the Standard Model. Both philosophers and physi-
cists have been deeply disturbed at the prospect of a beginning of time and 
an absolute origination of the universe and so have felt constrained to posit 
the existence of causally prior entities like quantum vacuum states, infla-
tionary domains, imaginary time regimes, and even timelike causal loops. 
The history of twentieth century astrophysical cosmology belies 
Morriston's claim that people have no strong intuitions about the need of a 
causal explanation of the origin of time and the universe. 
Perhaps Morriston would say that we should, at least, have no strong 
intuitions concerning the need of a cause of the beginning of time. But 
why not? What is the relevant difference between something's coming 
into existence within time and something's coming into existence at the 
beginning to time? If the universe could not come into existence uncaused 
at t, where t is preceded by earlier moments of time, why think that if we 
were to annihilate all moments earlier than t, then the universe could come 
into existence uncaused at t? How could the existence of moments earlier 
than an uncaused event be of any possible relevance to the occurrence of 
that event? 
Indeed, given a dynamic or tensed view of time, every moment of time 
is a fresh beginning, qualitatively indistinguishable from a first moment of 
time, for when any moment is present, earlier moments have passed away 
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and do not exist. Thus, if the universe could exist uncaused at a first 
moment of time, it could exist uncaused at any moment of time. There just 
does not seem to be any relevant difference. It follows that if the latter is 
metaphysically impossible, so is the former. 
Perhaps Morriston's difficulty is that he thinks of the causal principle as 
akin to a law of nature, like Boyle's Law or the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, which hold only within our universe. But the causal 
principle is not a physical principle, but a metaphysical principle. Being 
does not arise from non-being; something cannot come from nothing. 
These are putative metaphysical claims, unrestricted in their application. 
Such claims are not contingent upon the properties, causal powers, and 
dispositions of the natural kinds of substances which happen to exist. 
Morriston has given no good reason for construing such claims as merely 
physical rather than as metaphysical claims. 
Hence, until Morriston is able to show us the relevant difference 
between embedded moments of time and a first moment of time, I see no 
reason to think it more plausible that things can come into being uncaused 
at a first moment than at a later moment of time. 
Morriston presents a second reason for thinking premiss (1) to have 
diminished plausibility with respect to time's origin: U creation out of noth-
ing is at least as counterintuitive as is beginning to exist without a cause."9 
Now there is no doubt that creatio ex nilzilo is deeply baffling. I well recall 
thinking, as I began to study the kalam cosmological argument, that all of 
the alternatives with respect to the universe's existence-the infinitude of 
the past, creation ex nihilo, spontaneous origination ex nihilo -were so 
bizarre that the most reasonable option seemed to be that nothing exists! 
Since our existence is, however, undeniable, we must settle, however 
uncomfortably, on one of the above three. Since we assume for the sake of 
argument in the present discussion the finitude of the past, our choices are 
creation ex nihilo or an uncaused origination ex nihilo. It seems to me that 
there is a very simple and yet decisive reason for preferring creation, 
namely, whereas creation ex nihilo is counter-intuitive in denying to the 
universe a material cause, it at least ascribes to it an efficient cause, where-
as the spontaneous origination of the universe ex nihilo is doubly counter-
intuitive in that it denies of the universe both a material and (especially) an 
efficient cause. Thus, even if one agrees with Morriston's observation, 
"When I do the relevant 'thought experiments,' I find the absence of a mate-
rial cause at least as troubling as the absence of an efficient cause,"10 one can-
not agree with his objection, since an uncaused origin of the universe lacks 
both sorts of cause and so is doubly implausible. 
Morriston also complains that my reductive analysis of "x begins to 
exist" is so elaborate that premiss (I), so understood, "is not obviously sup-
ported by any widely shared metaphysical intuition."ll But this complaint 
is inappropriately lodged. I could have simply taken "begins to exist" as 
an undefined primitive in an intuitively true premiss. The worth of a 
reductive analysis of a concept is not to be judged by whether the original 
principle retains its intuitive sheen when the allalysans is substituted for the 
analysandum, but rather by whether the analysis succeeds in capturing our 
pre-analytic understanding of the concept. 12 The unanalyzed notion is 
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what we intuitively grasp, and we may struggle to find an adequate analy-
sis of it. The analysis may tum out to be quite complicated, requiring vari-
ous sorts of qualifications to ward off counter-examples. It is thus far less 
apt to be as intuitively obvious as the original concept. But its value is not 
to be measured by its intuitive obviousness, but by its adequacy to the con-
cept and its imperviousness to counter-examples. Thus, for example, the 
notion "begins to exist" cannot be adequately analyzed by stating 
AI. x begins to exist == x exists at t, and there is a time prior to t at 
which x does not exist. 
For if time and the universe originated at the Big Bang, it would follow from 
(AI) that the universe did not begin to exist, which is counter-intuitive, given 
the past finitude of its existence. So we might try to adjust (AI) to 
A2. x begins to exist == x exists at t, and there is no time prior to t at 
which x exists. 
This might seem to do the trick, for there mayor may not be time prior to t, 
according to (A2). Thus, the definition would apply to things originating 
both within time and with time. But then someone says, "What about 
something that ceases to exist for a time and then comes to exist a second 
time? Doesn't it begin to exist a second time?" That seems right; so we 
adjust (A2) to 
A3. x begins to exist == x exists at t, and there is no time immediately 
prior to t at which x exists. 
(A3) allows that x may have existed earlier than t but insists that in order 
to begin to exist at t there must be at least a temporal gap between any 
prior existence of x and x's existing at t. We now realize, however, that the 
adequacy of (A3) requires that t does not range over instants of time, since 
instants have no immediate predecessors. So in order to preserve our tem-
poral gap we must take t to range over non-degenerate, finite intervals of 
time. If this were not complicated enough, we now ask, "What about God? 
If He is timeless sans creation but temporal since creation, then (A3) 
requires that God began to exist./I Again, our intuitive understanding of 
"begins to exist" is violated if we must say that a being which never fails to 
exist begins to exist. In order to capture our intuitive understanding we 
need to preclude such a scenario. Thus, I arrived at 
A4. x begins to exist == x exists at t; there is no time immediately prior 
to t at which x exists; and the actual world contains no state of 
affairs involving x's timeless existence. 
The adequacy of (A4) as a reductive analysis is not to be judged by 
whether premiss (1) remains as intuitively obvious if we substitute the 
alllllysans for the llnalysllndum, but by whether there are counter-examples 
of situations which intuitively do (or do not) involve something's begin-
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ning to exist but which are such that (A4) would force us to say that they 
are not (or are) cases of somethllLg's begiIming to exist. 
Although Morriston does not attempt to show any deficiency in the 
analysis offered in (A4), I have come to believe on the basis of my work in 
trying to differentiate creation from conservation that (A4) does not, in fact, 
adequately capture our intuitive understanding of "begins to exist."13 It 
seems to me that at the heart of this notion lies the idea of "coming lllto 
being." The gist of premiss (1) is that something cannot come into being 
without a cause. Now again we could leave this notion as an undefined 
but well-understood primitive. But I think that we can capture this idea 
via the following analysis: 
AS. x comes into belllg at t == x exists at t; t is either the first time at 
which x exists or is separated from any time t*<t at which x existed 
by a non-degenerate, temporal interval; and x's existing at t is a 
tensed fact. 
The crucial modification here comes with the third clause: x does not 
merely exist tenselessly at t as part of a static, four-dimensional, "block" 
universe. Rather x's existing at t is an event of temporal becoming: x 
comes into being at t. It is in virtue of the reality of temporal becoming that 
x's beginning to exist requires a cause of x. Locutions like x's "poppmg 
into existence" or "sprmgmg into existence" were attempts on my part to 
express in ordinary language the objective reality of temporal becoming. 
Again, it just seems to me obvious that things do not begin to exist in this 
sense without a cause. 
Morriston, however, contends that we do not know the causal principle 
in any of its forms to be true by means of an apriori metaphysical mtuition.14 
Again, this is a conclusion which need little disturb nor long distract the 
proponent of the kalmn cosmological argument. As I explained in my 
exchange with Quentin Smith, it is a matter of indifference whether our 
intuition of the truth of the causal principle is a priori or a posteriori-ls That 
some synthetic truths are mtuited to be metaphysically necessary a posteri-
ori is evident from such examples as "Gold has atomic number 79" and 
"This table could not have been made of ice." It could well be that only 
logically posterior to our experience of reality do we intuitively grasp the 
necessary truth of the causal prmciple. 
Even considered on its own merits, however, Morriston's argument is 
lllconvincing because it is predicated upon a flawed methodology. He 
compares the causal principle to a truth like "The surface of an object can-
not be both red all over and partly green at one and the same time" and 
finds that the causal principle lacks the self-evidence and perspicuity of 
this truth. We could argue about how successfully the causal principle 
measures up to these criteria/6 but I suspect that such a debate would be 
fruitless. The more important shortcoming of Morriston's argument is its 
methodological assumption that all intuitively grasped, metaphysically 
necessary truths are alike in their self-evidence and perspicuity. As we 
have seen, some metaphysically necessary truths may be grasped only a 
posteriori and be quite debatable. Others may be grasped II priori but have 
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varying degrees of self-evidence and perspicuity. For example, the truth 
"No event precedes itself" is, I think, a synthetic, metaphysically necessary 
truth which we intuitively grasp, but it does not have the self-evidence or 
perspicuity of Morriston's red and green example. We can imagine a cir-
cular time in which an event precedes (and succeeds) itself, but I see no 
reason to think that such a representation is metaphysically possible. Or 
again, the statement "Torturing a child for fun is wrong" seems to me to be 
a metaphysically necessary truth which I intuit, despite my ability to imag-
ine in my mind's eye a nihilistic world without value. Examples could be 
given of a whole range of synthetic, metaphysically necessary truths, from 
the wholly obscure to the overwhelmingly self-evident, and it is no indict-
ment of the causal principle that it does not match the epistemic luminosity 
of the statement that something cannot be both red and green all over. 
What Morriston needs to do to undercut the causal prentiss of the lea/am 
cosmological argument is to show that its contradictory is as intuitively 
obvious as it is, which he has not even tried to do. 
Morriston thinks that anyone who claims that we have a metaphysical 
intuition of the truth of the causal principle is obliged to explain why other 
equally well-informed and intelligent people do not share this intuition.17 
This is an odd assertion, since a philosopher seems hardly obliged to give 
an account of the sociological and psychological factors which lead other 
philosophers to disagree with him. Perhaps Morriston's point is best inter-
preted as inductive evidence against the claim that the causal principle is 
intuitively true. But so construed, the shoe is on the other foot: it is 
Morriston who is obliged to explain why he and a handful of other philoso-
phers fail to see what the majority of philosophers and the overwhelming 
majority of mankind do see. The philosophers who deny that everything 
that begins to exist has a cause are a tiny minority of a tiny minority of 
mankind. Go ahead: name all the philosophers who believe that some-
thing can come into being without a cause or who are even agnostic about 
the matter. But be careful! Do not include Hume or Mackie.18 Do not 
include quantum physicists.19 The final list will be short, indeed. Morriston 
protests that he is not denying the truth of the causal principle, but merely 
that we have an apriori intuition of it.20 But, as I say, it is a matter of indiffer-
ence to me whether we come to grasp this principle a priori or a posteriori. I 
think it unlikely that the principle is for most of us an empirical generaliza-
tion, for we instinctively apply it in unfamiliar situations, and the idea that 
something could come out of nothing is more than empirically repugnant. 
Since Morriston goes on to deny that we do know this principle empirically, 
he is unlikely to say that the conviction of mankind is based, not on intu-
ition, but on empirical evidence. So it seems to me that the sociological evi-
dence is quite consistent with the claim that the causal principle is intuitive-
ly obvious, and if there is any explaining to be done, it falls to Morriston to 
explain why his little band of skeptics fail to see what the vast majority of 
people, both philosophers and non-philosophers, do claim to see and to 
explain how the bulk of mankind, in his view, can be so deceived. 
Finally, Morriston disputes our warrant for accepting the causal princi-
ple even as an empirical generalization.21 This I find amazing; how can 
anyone deny in light of our empirical experience that the causal principle is 
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more plausible than its contradictory? Here Morriston falls back on his 
distinction between temporally embedded events and events occurring at a 
first moment of time. Since we have experience only of temporally embed-
ded origination events, Morriston questions whether we have evidence 
that origination events at a first moment of time require causal explanation. 
As we have already seen, however, this appears to be a distinction without 
a difference. Morriston misleads when he labels the one case intratemporal 
coming to be and the other extra temporal coming to be, for both are cases of 
events which are temporally located at some time t. The only difference is 
that in one case t was preceded by moments of time t*<t and in the other 
case it was not. How this could be relevant to the occurrence of an 
uncaused event at t is wholly mysterious. 
Morriston also opposes two other empirical generalizations to the causal 
principle which he thinks enjoy comparable support but are allegedly 
incompatible with the kalam argument, to wit (i) Everything that begins to 
exist has a material cause, and (ii) Causes always stand in temporal relations to 
their effects. 22 Notice, however, that neither of these principles is incompati-
ble with the causal principle enunciated in premiss (1). Morriston, in truth, 
offers no defeater at all for the argument's causal premiss, taken as an 
empirical generalization. 
As defeaters of the conclusion (3) of the kalam argument, moreover, (i) 
and (ii) are not compelling. The evidence for (i) is, indeed, impressive. But 
it is not unequivocal or universal.23 More importantly, (i) is in my view 
simply overridden by the arguments for the finitude of the past. For if it is 
impossible that there be an infinite regress of past events, it is impossible 
that the First Cause be a material object, since matter/energy is never qui-
escent. 24 As for (ii), the problem here is that (ii) appears to be an accidental 
generalization, akin to Human beings have always lived on the Earth, which 
was true until 1968. There does not seem to be anything inherently tempo-
ral about a causal relationship. More importantly, however, (ii) is not at all 
incompatible with the kalam argument's conclusion, since its defender may 
hold that God exists timelessly sans creation and temporally at and subse-
quent to the moment of creation, so that His act of causing the beginning of 
the universe is simultaneous with the universe's beginning to exist. 
In summary, Morriston's claim that premiss (1) of the kalam cosmologi-
cal argument loses much of its plausibility when applied to the beginning 
of time is unwarranted. Apart from his question based on the distinction 
between intra- and extratemporal beginnings, Morriston provides no rea-
son to doubt the plausibility of the causal principle as an empirical general-
ization. That same dubious distinction lay at the heart of his denial that we 
have a metaphysical intuition of the principle's truth. His claim that the 
absence of a material cause is as troubling as the absence of an efficient 
cause backfires because in an uncaused origination of the universe we lack 
both, whereas in creatio ex nihilo we have at least an efficient cause. Finally, 
Morriston errs in thinking that a reductive analysis, if adequate, should 
have the same epistemic obviousness of the analysandUif/ and in thinking 
that all intuitively grasped, metaphysically necessary, synthetic truths 
should shine with the same self-evidence and perspicuity. In short, I do 
not think that in light of Morriston's critique, premiss (1) of the argument is 
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significantly diminished in its plausibility. In any case, it still remains 
more plausible than its contradictory. Thus, the answer to the first ques-
tion should be, "Yes, the universe has a cause." 
Must tlIe Cause of tlIe Universe Be a Person? 
In the second part of his article Morriston, still assuming that God exists 
atemporally sans the universe, criticizes an argument for the personhood 
of the First Cause inspired by the Islamic Principle of Determination. In a 
nutshell, the argument is that, given a tensed theory of time, only personal, 
free agency can account for the origin of a first temporal effect from a 
changeless cause. As we have seen, on a tensed theory of time, the uni-
verse comes into being at the first moment of its existence. The event of the 
universe's coming into being cannot be an instance of state-state causation 
or event-event causation, since the origination of the universe is not a state 
and the condition of the timeless cause not an event. But neither can it be 
an instance of state-event causation, for this seems clearly impossible: If 
the unchanging cause is sufficient for the production of the effect, then the 
cause should not exist without the effect, that is to say, we should have 
state-state causation. If the cause is not sufficient for the production of the 
effect, then some change must take place in the cause to produce the effect, 
in which we have event-event causation and we must inquire all over 
again for the cause of the first event. The best way out of this dilemma is 
agent causation, whereby the agent freely brings about some event in the 
absence of prior determining conditions. 
Morriston raises two objections to this argument: (i) Quantum mechan-
ics allow for causal conditions which are not strictly speaking sufficient for 
their effects, and (ii) God's changeless state of willing the universe is suffi-
cient for the existence of the universe and is an instance of state-state causa-
tion.25 Since I have elsewhere addressed (i),'" I shall concentrate here on (ii). 
I am inclined simply to deny that God's eternally willing to create the 
universe, properly understood, is sufficient for the existence of the universe. 
As J. P. Moreland explains, in the case of personal causal explanations, the 
salient factors are the existence of an agent with his relevant properties and 
powers, the agent's intention to bring about some result, an exercise of the 
agent's causal powers, and in some cases a description of the relevant action 
plan. So "a personal explanation (divine or otherwise) of some basic result 
R brought about intentionally by person P where this bringing about of R is 
a basic action A will cite the intention I of P that R occur and the basic 
power B that P exercised to bring about R"27 Notice that it is insufficient for 
P to have merely the intention and power to bring about R There must also 
be a basic action on the part of P, an undertaking or endeavoring or exercise 
of P's causal powers. 11ms, it is insufficient to account for the origin of the 
universe by citing simply God, His timeless intention to create a world with 
a beginning, and His power to produce such a result. There must be an 
exercise of His causal power in order for the universe to be created. That 
entails, of course, an intrinsic change on God's part which brings Him into 
time at the moment of creation. For that reason He must be temporal since 
creation even if He is timeless sans creation.28 Such an account of the origin 
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of the universe will work only for agent causation, for only a libertarian 
agent could interrupt the static reign of being of the First Cause sans the 
universe. It is for that reason that we should conceive of the First Cause as 
personal. Hence, the failing of Morriston's objection is that in speaking of 
God's willing that the universe exist, he does not differentiate between 
God's timeless intention to create a temporal world and God's undertaking 
to create a temporal world. Once we make the distinction, we see that cre-
ation ex nihilo is not an instance of state-state causation and is therefore not 
susceptible to Morriston's objection. 
Conclusion 
I conclude that Morriston has not defeated the conclusion that if time 
and the universe had a First Cause, that Cause is plausibly personal. 
Moreover, he has not shown that the plausibility of the causal premiss is 
greatly diminished by the various considerations he raises. Finally, even if 
the plausibility of that premiss were greatly reduced, nothing has been said 
to show that it is still not more plausible than its contradictory. If the kalam 
argument is unsound or unpersuasive, it is unlikely that the fault lies in its 
first premiss.2" 
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